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Friday 13 January, 2012
teal ghd straightener [  one is looking at the picture. And now, what is this "See, it's looking!" —does it express a sensation? 2o6<= PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi (In giving all these examples I am not aiming at some kind of completeness, some classification of psychological concepts. They are only meant to enable the reader to shift for himself when he encounters conceptual difficulties.) "Now I see it as a ... ." goes with "I am trying to see it as a ... ." or "I can't see it as a .... yet". But I cannot try to see a conventional picture of a lion as a lion, any more than an F as that letter. (Though I may well try t ghd mk4 o see it as a gallows, for example.) Do not ask yourself "How does it work with met"—Ask "What do I know about someone else?" How does one play the game: "It could be this too"? (What a figure could also be—which is what it can be seen as—is not simply another figure. If someone said "I see he might still be meaning very different things.) Here is a game played by children: they say that a chest, for example, is a house; and thereupon it is interpreted as a house in every detail. A piece of fancy is worked into it. And does the child now see the chest as a house? "He quite forgets that it is a chest; for him it actually is a house." (There are definite tokens of this.) Then would it not also be correct to say he sees it as a house? And if you knew how to play this game, and, given a particular situation, you exclaimed with special expression "Now it's a house!"— you would be giving expression to the dawning of an aspect. If I heard someone talking about the duck-rabbit, and now he spoke in a certain way about the special expression of the rabbit's face I should say, now he's seeing the picture as a rabbit. But the expression in one's voice and gestures is the same as if the object had altered and had ended by becoming this or that. I have a theme played to me several times and each time in a slower tempo. In the end I say "Now it's right", or "Now at last it's a march", "Now at last it's a dance".—The same tone of voice expresses the dawning of an aspect. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Hxi 207* Tine shades of behaviour.'—When my understanding of a theme is expressed by my whistling it with the correct expression, this is an example of such fine shades. The aspects of the triangle: it is as if an image came into contact, and for a time remained in contact, with the visual impression. In this, however, these aspect ghd hair straightener south africa s differ from the concave and convex aspects of the step (for example). And also from the aspects of the figure (which I shall call a "double cross") as a white cross on a black ground and as a black cross on a white ground. You must remember that the descriptions of the alternating aspects are of a different kind in each case. (The temptation to say "I see it like fbis", pointing to the same thing for "it" and "this".) Always get rid of the idea of the private object in this way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you. Those two aspects of the double cross (I shall call them the aspects A) might be reported simply by pointing alternately to an isolated white and an isolated black cross. One could quite well imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child even before it could talk. (Thus in reporting the aspects A we point to a part of the double cross.—The duck and rabbit aspects could not be described in an analogous way.) You only 'see the duck and rabbit aspects' if you are already conversant with the shapes of those two animals. There is no analogous condition for seeing the aspects A. It is possible to take the duck-rabbit simply for the picture of a rabbit, the double cross simply for the picture of a bl ghd pure ack cross, but not to take the bare triangular figure for the picture of an object that has fallen over. To see this aspect of the triangle demands imagination. ,208e PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi The aspects A are not essentially three-dimensional; a black cross on a white ground is not essentially a cross with a white surface in the background. You could teach someone the idea of the black cross on a ground of different colour without shewing him anything but crosses painted pink hair straighteners on sheets of paper. Here the 'background' is simply the surrounding of the cross. The aspects A are not connected with the possibility of illusion in the same way as are the three-dimensional aspects of the drawing of a cube or step. I can see the schematic cube as a box;—but can I also see it now as a paper, now as a tin, box?—What ought I to say, if someone assured me he could?—I can set a limit to the concept here. Yet think of the expression "felt" in connexion with looking at a picture. ("One feels the softness of that material") (Knowing in dreams. "And I knew that . . . was in the room.") How does one teach a child (say in arithmetic) "Now take these things together!" or "Now these go together"? Clearly "taking together" and "going together" must originally have had another meaning for him than that of seeing in this way or that.—And this is a remark about concepts, not about teaching methods. One kind of aspect might be called 'aspects of organization'. When the aspect changes parts of the picture go together which before did not. In the triangle I can see now this as apex, that as base—now this as apex, that as base.—Clearly the words "Now I am seeing this as the apex" cannot so far mean anything to a learner who has only just met the concepts of apex, base, and so on.—But I do not mean this as an empirical proposition. "Now he's seeing it like this", "now like that" would only be said of someone capable of making certain applications of the figure quite freely. The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique. But how queer for this to be the logical condition of someone's having such-and-such an experience^. After all, you don't say ghd sale that one only 'has toothache' if one is capable of doing such-and-such.—From this it follows that we cannot be dealing with the same concept of experience here. It is a different though related concept. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he has had this experience. And if this sounds crazy, you need to reflect that the concept of seeing is modified here. (A similar consideration is often necessary to get rid of a feeling of dizziness in mathematics.) We talk, we utter words, and only later get a picture of their life. For how could I see that this posture was hesitant before I knew that it was a posture and not the anatomy of the animal? But surely that only means that I cannot use this concept to describe the object of sight, just because it has more than purely visual reference?— Might I not for all that have a purely visual concept of a hesitant posture, or of a timid face? Such a concept would be comparable with 'major' and 'minor' which certainly have emotional value, but can also be used purely to describe a perceived structure. The epithet "sad", as applie ghd flat iron d for example to the outline face, characterizes the grouping of lines in a circle. Applied to a human being it has a different (though related) meaning. (But this does not mean that a sad expression is like the feeling of sadness!) Think of this too: I can only see, not hear, red and green,—but sadness I can hear as much as I can see it. Think of the expression "I heard a plaintive melody". And now the question is: "Doe ghd iv straighteners s he hear the plaint?" And if I reply: "No, he doesn't hear it, he merely has a sense of it"— where does that get us? One cannot mention a sense-organ for this 'sense'. Some would like to reply here: "Of course I hear it!"—Others: "I don't really bear it." We can, however, establish differences of concept here. We react to the visual impression differently from someone who does not recognize it as tim ghd sale id (in the full sense of the word).—But I do not want to say here that we feel this reaction in our muscles and joints and that this is the 'sensing'.—No, what we have here is a modified concept of sensation. 2I0e PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi One might say of someone that he was blind to the expression of a face. Would his eyesight on that account be defective? This is, of course, not simply a question for physiology. Here the physiological is a symbol of the logical. If you feel the seriousness of a tune, what are you perceiving?— Nothing that could be conveyed by reproducing what you heard. I can imagine some arbitrary cipher—this, for instance: to be a strictly correct letter of some foreign alphabet. Or again, to be a faultily written one, and faulty in this way or that: for example, it might be slap-dash, or typical childish awkwardness, or like the flourishes in a legal document. It could deviate, from the correctly written letter in a variety of ways.—And I can see it in various aspects according to the fiction I surround it with. And here there is a close kinship with 'experiencing the meaning of a word'. I should like to say that what dawns here lasts only as long as I am occupied with the object in a particular way. ("See, it's looking 1")—— 'I should like to say'—and is it so?——Ask yourself "For how long am I struck by a thing?"—For how long do I find it new? The aspect presents a physiognomy which then passes away. It is almost as if there were a face there which at first I imitate, and then accept without imitating it.—And isn't this really explanation enough? —But isn't it too much? "I observed the likeness between him and his father for a few minutes, and then no longer."—One might say this if his face were changing and only looked like his father's for a short time. But it can also mean that after a few minutes I stopped being struck by the likeness. "After the likeness had struck you, how long were you aware of it?" What kind of answer might one give to this question?—"I soon stopped thinking about it", or "It struck me again from time to time", or "I several times had the thought, how like they arel", or "I marvelled at the likeness for coloured ghds at least a minute"—That is the sort of answer you would get. I should like to put the question "Am I aware of the spatial character, the depth of an object (of this cupboard for instance), the whole time PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi I am seeing it?" Do I, so to speak,/*??/ it the whole time?—But put the question in the third person.—When would you say of someone that he was aware of it the whole time, and when the opposite?—Of course, one could ask him,—but how did he learn how to answer such a question?—He knows what it means "to feel pain continuously". But that will only confuse him here (as it confuses me). If he now says he is continuously aware of the depth—do I believe him? And if he says he is aware of it only occasionally (when talking about it, perhaps)—do I believe that? These answers will strike me as resting on a false foundation.—It will be different if he says that the object sometimes strikes him as flat, sometimes as three-dimensional. Someone tells me: "I looked at the flower, but was thinking of something els ghd sale e and was not conscious of its colour." Do I understand this?—I can imagine a s cheap ghd straighteners uk ignificant context, say his going on: "Then I suddenly saw it, and realized it was the one which ......". Or again: "If I had turned away then, I could not have said what colour it was." "He looked at it without seeing it."—There is such a thing. But what is the criterion for it?—Well, there is a variety of cases here. "Just now I looked at the shape rather than at the colour." Do not let such phrases confuse you. Above all, don't wonder "What can be going on in the eyes or brain?" The likeness makes a striking impression on me; then the impression fades. It only struck me for a few minutes, and then no longer did. What happened here?—What can I recall? My own facial expression comes to mind; I could reproduce it. If someone who knew me had seen my face he would have said "Something about his face struck you just now".—There further occurs to me what I say on such an occasion, out loud or to myself. And that is all.—And is this what being struck is? No. These are the phenomena of being struck; but they are 'what happens'. Is being struck looking plus thinking? No. Many of our concepts cross here. ('Thinking' and 'inward speech'—I do not say 'to oneself*—are different concepts.) I2e PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi The colour of the visual impression corresponds to the colour of :he object (this blotting paper looks pink to me, and is pink)—the shape of the visual impression to the shape of the object (it looks rectmgular to me, and is rectangular)—but what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects. It is almost as if 'seeing the sign in this context' were an echo of a thought. "The echo of a coloured ghds uk thought in sight"—one would like to say.
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