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Friday 13 January, 2012
lepoard print ghds  it did not really fit. But no squeezing, no forcing took place here. When it looks as if there were no room for such a form between other ones you have to look for it in another dimension. If there is no room here, there is room in another dimension. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Hxi 201* (It is in this sense too that there is no room for imaginary numbers in the continuum of real numbers. But what this means is: the application of the concept of imaginary numbers is less like that of real numbers than appears from the look of the calculations. It is necessary to get down to the application, and then the concept finds a different place, one which, so to speak, one coloured ghds never dreamed of.) How would the following account do: "What I can see something asy is what it can be a picture of"? What this means is: the aspects in a change of aspects are those ones which the figure might sometimes have permanently in a picture. A triangle can really be standing up in one picture, be hanging in another, and can in a third be something that has fallen over.—That is, I who am looking at it say, not "It may also be something that has fallen over", but "That glass has fallen over and is lying there in fragments". T cheap ghd straighteners uk his is how we react to the picture. Could I say what a picture must be like to produce this effect? No. There are, for example, styles of painting which do not convey anything to me in this immediate way, but do to other people. I think custom and upbringing have a hand in this. What does it mean to say that I 'see t ghd sale he sphere floating in the air' in a picture? Is it enough that this description is the first to hand, is the matterof- course one? No, for it might be so for various reasons. This might, for instance, simply be the conventional description. What is the expression of my not merely understanding the picture in this way, for instance, (knowing what it is supposed to be), but seeing it in this way?—It is expressed by: "The sphere seems to float", "You see it floating", or again, in a special tone of voice, "It floats!" This, then, is the expression of taking something for something. coloured ghds uk But not being used as such. Here we are not asking ourselves what are the causes and what produces this impression in a particular case. And is it a special impression?—"Surely I see something different when I see the sphere floating from when I merely see it lying there."— ghd pure This really means: This expression is justified!—(For taken literally it is no more than a repetition.) 202* PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi (And yet my impression is not that of a real floating sphere either. There are various forms of 'three-dimensional seeing'. The threedimensional character of a photograph and the three-dimensional character of what we see through a stereoscope.) "And is it really a different impression?"—In order to answer this I should like to ask myself whether there is really something different there in me. But how can I find out?——I describe what I am seeing differently. Certain drawings are always seen as flat figures, and others sometimes, or always, three-dimensionally. Here one would now like to say: the visual impression of what is seen three-dimensionally is three-dimensional; with the schematic cube, for instance, it is a cube. (For the description of the impression is the description of a cube.) And then it seems queer that with some drawings our impression should be a flat thing, and with some a three-dimensional thing. One asks oneself "Where is this going to end?" When I see the picture of a galloping horse—do I merely know that this is the kind of movement meant? Is it superstition to think I see the horse galloping in the picture?——And does my visual impression gallop too? What does anyone tell me by saying "Now I see it as .... ."? What consequences has this information? What can I do with it? People often associate colours with vowels. Someone might find that a vowel changed its colour when it was repeated over and over again. He finds a 'now blue—now red', for instance. The expression "Now I am seeing it as . . ." might have no more significance for us than: "Now I find a red". (Linked with physiological observations, even this change might acquire importance for us.) Here it occurs to me that in conversation on aesthetic matters we use the words: "You have to see it like this, this is how it is meant"; "When you see it like this, you see where it goes wrong"; "You have to hear this bar as an introduction"; "You must hear it in this key"; "You must phrase it like this" (which can refer to hearing as well as to playing). PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi 203* This figure a is supposed to represent a convex step and to be used in some kind of topological demonstration. For this purpose we draw the straight line a through the geometric centres of the two surfaces.—Now if anyone's three-dimensional impression of the figure were never more than momentary, and even so were now concave, now convex, that might make it difficult for him to follow our demonstration. And if he finds that the flat aspect alternates with a three-dimensional one, that is just as if I were to shew him completely different objects in the course of the demonstration. What does it mean for me to look at a drawing in descriptive geometry and say: "I know that this line appears again here, but I can't see it like that"? Does it simply mean a lack of familiarity in operating with the drawing; that I don't 'know my way about' too well?—This familiarity is certainly one of our criteria. What tells us that someone is seeing the drawing three-dimensionally is a certain kind of 'knowing one's way about'. Certain gestures, for instance, which indicate the three-dimensional relations: fine shades of behaviour. I see that an animal in a picture is transfixed by an arrow. It has struck it in the throat and sticks out at the back of the neck. Let ghd sale the picture be a silhouette.—Do you see the arrow—or do you merely know that these two bits are supposed to represent part of an arrow? (Compare Kohler' ghd mk4 s figure of the interpenetrating hexagons.) "But this isn't seeing]"——"But this is seeing I"—It must be possible to give both remarks a conceptual justification. But this is seeing! In what sense is it seeing? "The phenomenon is at first surprising, but a physiological explanation of it will certainly be found."— Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual one. If the picture of the transfixed beast or of the interpenetrating hexagons were shewn to me just for a moment and then I had to describe it, that would be my description; if I had to draw it I should 204e PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi certainly produce a very faulty copy, but it would shew some sort of animal transfixed by an arrow, or two hexagons interpenetrating. That is to say: there are certain mistakes that I should not make. The first thing to jump to my eye in this picture is: there are two hexagons. Now I look at them and ask myself: "Do I really see them as hexagons?"— and for the whole time they are before my eyes? (Assuming that they have not ghd hair straightener south africa changed their aspect in that time.)—And I should like to reply: "I am not thinking of them as hexagons the whole time." Someone tells me: "I saw it at once as two hexagons. And that's the whole of what I saw." But how do I understand this? I think he would have given this description at once in answer to the question "What are you seeing?", nor would he have treated it as one among several possibilities. In this his description is like the answer "A face" on being shewn the figure The best description I can give of what was shewn me for a moment is this: ..... "The impressi ghd iv straighteners on was that of a rearing animal." So a perfectly definite description c ghd sale ame out.—Was it seeing, or was it a thought? Do not try to analyse your own inner experience. Of course I might also have seen the picture first as something different, and then have said to myself "Oh, it's two hexagons!" So the aspect would have altered. And does this prove that I in fact saw it as something definite? "Is it a genuine visual experience?" The question is: in what sense is it one? Here it is difficult to see that what is at issue is the fixing of concepts. A concept forces itself on one. (This is what you must not forget.) For when should I call it a mere case of knowing, not seeing?— Perhaps when someone treats the picture as a working drawing, reads it like a blueprint. (Fine shades of behaviour.—Why are they important* They have important consequences.) PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilxi 205* "To me it is an animal pierced by an arrow." That is what I treat it as; this is my attitude to the figure. This is one meaning in calling it a case of 'seeing'. But can I say in the same sense: "To me these are two hexagons"? Not in the same sense, but in a similar one. You need to think of the role which pictures such as paintings (as opposed to working drawings) have in our lives. This role is by no means a uniform one. A comparison: texts are sometimes hung on the wall. But not theorems of mechanics. (Our relation to these two things.) If you see the drawing as such-and-such an animal, what I expect from you will be pretty different from what I expect when you merely know what it is meant to be. Perhaps the following expression would have been better: we regard the photograph, the picture on our wall, as the object itself (the man, landscape, and so o pink hair straighteners n) depicted there. This need not have been so. We could easily imagine peo ghd flat iron ple who did not have this relation to such pictures. Who, for example, would be repelled by photographs, because a face without colour and even perhaps a face reduced in scale struck them as inhuman. I say: "We regard a portrait as a human being,"—but when do we do so, and for how long? Always, if we see it at all (and do not, say, see it as something else)? I might say yes to this, and that would determine the concept of regarding-as.—The question is whether yet another concept, related to this one, is also of importance to us: that, namely, of a seeing-as which only takes place while I am actually concerning myself with the picture as the object depicted. I might say: a picture does not always live for me while I am seeing it. "Her picture smiles down on me from the wall." It need not always do so, whenever my glance lights on it. The duck-rabbit. One asks oneself: how can the eye—this dot— be looking in a direction?—"See, if is looking^ (And one 'looks' oneself as one says this.) But one does not say and do this the whole time one is looking at the picture. And now, what is this "See, it's looking!" —does i
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