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Friday 13 January, 2012
leopard print ghds  How should we counter someone who told us that with him understanding was an inner process?——How should we counter him if he said that with him knowing how to play chess was an inner process?— We should say that when we want to know if he can play chess we aren't interested in anything that goes on inside him.—And if he replies that this is in fact just what we are interested in, tha ghd sale t is, we are interested in whether he can play chess—then we shall have to draw his attention to the criteria which would demonstrate his capacity, and on the other hand to the criteria for the 'inner states'. Even if someone had a particular capacity only when, and only as long as, he had a particular feeling, the feeling would not be the capacity. The meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying it, and the sense of a sentence is not a complex of such experiences.—( How do the meanings of the individual words make up the sense of the sentence "I still haven't seen him yet"?) The sentence is composed of the words, and that is enough. Though—one would like to say—every word has a different character in different contexts, at the same time there is one character it always has: a single physiognomy. It looks at us.—But a face in a painting looks at us too. Are you sure that there is a single if-feeling, and not perhaps several? Have you tried saying the word in a great variety of contexts? For 181* i82e PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Hvi example, when it bears the principal stress of the sentence, and when the word next to it does. Suppose we found a man who, speaking of how words felt to him, told us that "if" and "but" felt the same.—Should we have the right to disbelieve him? We might think it strange. "He doesn't play our game at all", one would like to say. Or even: "This is a different type of man." If he used the words "if" and "but" as we do, shouldn't we think he understood them as we do? One misjudges the psychological interest of the if-feeling if one regards it as the obvious correlate of a meaning; it needs rather to be seen in a different context, in that of the special circumstances in which it occurs. Does a person never have the if-feeling when he is not uttering the word "if"? Surely it is at least remarkable if this cause alone produces this feeling. And this applies generally to the 'atmosphere' of a word;—why does one regard it so much as a matter of course that only this word has this atmosphere? The if-feeling is not a feeling which accompanies the word "if". The if-feeling coloured ghds uk would have to be compared with the special 'feeling* which a musical phrase gives us. (One sometimes describes such a feeling by saying "Here it is as if a conclusion were being drawn", or "I should like to say *hence .....'", or "Here I should always like to make a gesture—" and then one makes it.) But can this feeling be separated from the phrase? And yet it is not the phrase itself, for that can be heard without the coloured ghds feeling. Is it in this respect like the 'expression' with which the phrase is played? We say this passage gives us a quite special feeling. We sing it to ourselves, and make a certain movement, and also perhaps have some special sensation. But in a different context we should not recognize these accompaniments—the movement, the sensation—at all. They are quite empty except just when we are singing this passage. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Hvi 18}* "I sing i ghd hair straightener south africa t with a quite particular expression." This expression is not something that can be separated from the passage. It is a different concept. (A different game.) The experience is this passage played like this (that is, as I am doing it, for instance; a descriptio ghd mk4 n could only hint at it). Thus the atmosphere that is inseparable from its object—is not an atmosphere. Closely associated things, things which we have associated, seem to fit one another. But what is this seeming to fit? How is their seeming to fit manifested? Perhaps like this: we cannot imagine the man who had this name, this face, this handwriting, not to have produced these works, but perhaps quite different ones instead (those of anoth pink hair straighteners er great man). We cannot imagine it? Do we try?— Here is a possibility: I hear that someone is painting a picture "Beethoven writing the ninth symphony". I could easily imagine the kind of thing such a picture would shew us. But suppose someone wanted to represent what Goethe would have looked like writing the ninth symphony? Here I could imagine nothing that would not be embarrassing and ridiculous. Vll People who on waking tell us certain incidents (that they have been in such-and-such places, etc.). Then we teach them the expression "I dreamt", which precedes the narrative. Afterwards I sometimes ask them "did you dream a ghd flat iron nything last night?" and am answered yes or no, sometimes with an account of a dream, sometimes not. That is the language-game. (I have assumed here that I do not dream myself. But then, nor do I ever have the feeling of an invisible presence; other people do, and I can question them about their experiences.) Now must I make some assumption about whether people are deceived by their memories or not; whether they really had these images while they slept, or whether it merely seems so to them on waking? And what meaning has this question?—And what interest? Do we ever ask ourselves this when someone is telling us his dream? And if not—is it because we are sure his memory won't have deceived him? (And suppose it were a man with a quite specially bad memory?—) Does this mean that it is nonsense ever to raise the question whether dreams really take place during sleep, or are a memory phenomenon of the awakened? It will turn on the use of the question. "The mind seems able to give a word meaning"—isn't this as if I were to say "The carbon atoms in benzene seem to lie at the corners of a hexagon"? But this is not something that seems to be so; it is a picture. The evolution of the higher animals and of man, and the awakening of consciousness at a particular level. The picture is something like this: Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light. What this language primarily describes is a picture. What is to be done with the picture, how it is to be used, is still obscure. Quite clearly, however, it must be explored if we want to understand the sense of what we are saying. But the picture seems to spare us this work: it already points to a particular use. This is how it takes us in. i84e Vlll "My kinaesthetic sensations advise me of the movement and position of my limbs." I let my index finger make an easy pendulum movement of small amplitude. I either hardly feel it, or don't feel it at all. Perhaps a little in the tip of the finger, as a slight tension. (Not at all in the joint.) And this sensation advises me of the movement?—for I can describe the movement exactly. "But after all, you must feel it, otherwise you wouldn't know (without looking) how your finger was moving." But "knowing" it only means: being able to describe it.—I may be able to tell the direction from which a sound comes only because it affects one ear more strongly than the other, but I don't feel this in my ears; yet it has its effect: I know the direction from which the sound comes; for instance, I look in that direction. It is the same with the idea that it must be some feature of our pain that advises us of the whereabouts of the pain in the body, and some feature of our memory image that tells us the time to which it belongs. A sensation can advise us of the movement or position of a limb. (For example, if you do not know, as a normal person does, whether your arm is stretched out, you might find out by a piercing pain in the elbow.)—In the same way the character of a pain can tell us where the injury is. ghd sale (And the yellowness of a photograph how old it is.) What is the criterion for my learning the shape and colour of an object from a sense-impression? What sense-impression? Well, this one; I use words or a picture to describe it. And now: what do you feel when your fingers are in this position?— "How is one to define a feeling? It is something special and indefinable." But it must be possible to teach the use of the words I What I am looking ghd pure for is the grammatical difference. Let us leave the kinaesthetic feeling out for the moment.—I want to describe a feeling to someone, and I tell him "Do thist and then you*!! 185* i86. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilviii get it," and I hold my arm or my head in a particular position. Now is this a description of a feeling? and when shall I say that he has understood what feeling I meant?—He will have to give afurther description of the feeling afterwards. And what kind of description must it be? I say "Do fbis, and you'll get it". Can't there be a doubt here? Mustn't there be one, if it is a feeling that is meant? This looks so; this tastes so; this feels so. "This" and "so" must be differently explained. Our interest in a 'feeling' is of a quite particular kind. It includes, for instance, the 'degree of the feeling', its 'place', and the extent to which one feeling can be submerged by another. (When a movement is very painful, so that the pain submerges every other slight sensation in the same place, does this make it uncertain whether you have really made this movement? Could it lead you to find out by looking?) ix If you observe your own grief, which senses do you use to observe it? A particular sense; one that/*?*// grief? Then do you feel it differently when you are observing it? And what is the grief that you are observing— is it one which is there ghd sale only while it is being observed? 'Observing' does not produce what is observed. (That is a conceptual statement.) Again: I do not 'observe' what only comes into being through observation. The object of observation is something else. A touch which was still painful yesterday is no longer so today. Today I feel the pain only when I think about it, (That is: in certain circumstances.) My grief is no longer the same; a memory which was still unbearable to me a year ago is now no longer so. That is a result of observation. When do we say that any one is observing? Roughly: when he puts himself in a favourable position to receive certain impressions in order (for example) to describe what they tell him. If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colours, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colours. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance). If I let my gaze wander round a room and suddenly it lights on an object of a striking red colour, and I say "Redl"—that is not a description. Are the words "I am afraid" a description of a state of mind? I say "I am afraid"; someone else asks me: "What was that? A cry of fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or is it a reflection on your present state?"—Could I always give him a clear answer? Could I never give him one? 187* i88. PHI ghd iv straighteners LOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilix We can imagine all sorts of things here, for example: "No, no! I am afraid!" "I am afraid. I am sorry to have to confess it." "I am still a bit afraid, but no longer as much as before." "At bottom I am still afraid, though I won't confess it to myself." "I torment myself with all sorts of fears." "Now, just when I should be fearless, I am afraid!" To each of these sentences a special tone of voice is appropriate, and a different context. It would be possible to imagine people who as it were thought much more definitely than we, and used different words where we use only one. Wr e ask "What does 'I am frightened' really mean, what am I referring to when I say it?" And of course we find no answer, or one that is inadequate. The question is: "In what sort of context does it occur?" I can find no answer if I try to settle the question "What am I referring to?" "What am cheap ghd straighteners uk I thinking when I say it?" by repeating the expression of fear and at the same time attending to myself, as it were observing my soul out of the corner of my eye. In a concrete case I can indeed ask "Why did I say that, what did I mean by it?"— and I might answer the question too; but not on the ground of observing what accompanied the speaking. And my answer would supplement, paraphrase, the earlier utterance. What is fear? What does "being afraid" mean? If I wanted to define it at a single shewing—I should play-act fear. Could I also represent hope in this way? Hardly. And what about belief? Describing my state of mind (of fear, say) is something I do in a particular context. (Just as it takes a particular context to make a certain action into an experiment.) Is it, then, so surprising that I use the same expression in different games? And sometimes as it were between the games? And do I always talk with very definite purpose?—And is what I say meaningless because I don't? PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Ilix When it is said in a funeral oration "We mourn our . . . ." this is surely supposed to be an expression of mourning; not to tell anything to those who are present. But in a prayer at the grave these words would in a way be used to tell someone something. But here is the problem: a cry, which
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