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Friday 13 January, 2012
ghd hair straightener  nguage, are not mere threadbare representations of the real experiences; for is what is linguistic not an experience? 650. We cheap ghd straighteners uk say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his master will beat him ghd sale to-morrow. Why not? 651. "I remember that I should have been glad then to stay still longer."—What picture of this wish came before my mind? None at all. What I see in my memory allows no conclusion as to my feelings. And yet I remember quite clearly that they were there. 652. "He measured him with a hostile glance and said ....'* The reader of the narrative understands this; he has no doubt in his mind. Now you say: "Very well, he supplies the meaning, he guesses it."—Generally speaking: no. Generally speaking he supplies nothing, guesses nothing.—But it is also possible that the hostile glance and the words later prove to have been pretence, or that the reader is kept in doubt whether they are so or not, and so that he really does guess at a possible interpretation.—But then the main thing he guesses at is a context. He says to himself for example: The two men who are here so hostile to one another are in reality friends, etc. etc. (("If you want to understand a sentence, you have to imagine the psychical significance, the states of mind involved.")) 653. Imagine this case: I tell someone that I walked a certain route, going by a map which I had prepared beforehand. Thereupon I shew him the map, and it consists of lines on a piece of paper; but I cannot explain how these lines are the map of my movements, I cannot tell him any rule for interpreting the map. Yet I did follow the drawing with all the characteristic tokens of reading a map. I might call such a drawing a 'private' map; or the phenomenon that I have described "following a private map". (But this expression would, of course, be very easy to misunderstand.) Could I now say: "I read off my having then meant to do such-and- PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I 1676 such, as if from ghd iv straighteners a map, although there is no map"? But that means nothing but: I am now inclined to say "I read the intention of acting thus in certain states of mind which I remember." 654. Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played. 655. The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game. 656. What is the purpose of telling someone that a time ago I had such-and-such a wish?—Look on the language-game as the. primary thing. And look on the feelings, etc., as you look on a way of regarding the language-game, as interpretation. It might be asked: how did human beings ever come to make the verbal utterances which we call reports of past wishes or past intentions? 657. Let us imagine these utterances always taking this form: "I said to myself: 'if only I could stay longer I* " The purpose of such a statement might be to acquaint someone with my reactions. (Compare the grammar of "mean" and "vouloir dire".) 658. Suppose we expressed the fact that a man had an intention by saying "He as it were said to himself 'I will. . . .' "—That is the picture. And n ghd sale ow I want to know: how does one employ the expression "as it were to say something to oneself"? For it does not mean: to say something to oneself. 659. Why do I want to tell him about an intention too, as well as telling him what 1 did?—Not because the intention was also something which was going on at that time. But because I want to tell him something about myself, which goes beyond what happened at that time. I reveal to him something of myself when I tell him what I was going to do.—Not, however, on grounds of self-observation, but by way of a response (it might also be called an intuition). 660. The grammar of the expression "I was then going to say . . . ." is related to that of the expression "I could then have gone on." In the one case I remember an intention, in the other I remember having understood. i68e PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I 661. I remember having meant him. Am I remembering a process or state?—When did it begin, what was its course; etc.? 662. In an only slightly different situation, instead of silently beckoning, he would have said to someone "Tell N. to come to me." One can now say that the words "I wanted N. to come to me" describe the state of my mind at that time; and again one may not say so. 663. If I say "I meant him" very likely a picture comes to my mind, perhaps of how I looked at him, etc.; but the picture is only like an illustration to a story. From it alone it would mostly be impossible to conclude anything at all; only when one knows the story does one know the significance of the picture. 664. In the use of words one might distinguish 'surface grammar' from 'depth grammar'. What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use—one might say—that can be taken in by the ear.——And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about. 665. Imagine someone pointing to his cheek with an expression of pain and saying "abracadabra!"—We ask "What do you mean?" And he answers "I meant toothache".—You at once think to yourself: How can one 'mean toothache' by that word? Or what did it mean to mean pain by that word? And yet, in a different context, you would have asserted that the mental activity of meaning such-and-such was just what was most important in using language. But—can't I say "By 'abracadabra' I mean toothache"? Of course I can; but this is a definition; not a description of what goes on in me when I utter the word. 666. Imagine that you were in pain and were simultaneously hearing a nearby piano being tuned. You say "It'll soon stop." It certainly makes quite a difference whether you mean the pain or the piano-tuning!—Of course; but what does this difference consist in? I admit, in many cases some direction of the attention will correspond to your meaning one thing or another, just as a look often does, or a gesture, or a way of shutting one's eyes which might be called "looking into oneself". PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I i69. 667. Imagine someone simulating pain, and then saying "It'll get better soon". Can't one say he means the pain? and yet he is not concentrating his attention on any pain.—And what about when I finally say "It's stopped now"? 668. But can't one also lie in this way: one says "It'll stop soon", and means pain—but when asked "What did you mean?" one answers "The noise in the next room"? In this sort of case one may say: "I was going to answer.... but thought better of it and did answer ....." 669. One can refer to an object when speaking by pointing to it. Here pointing is a part of the language-game. And now it seems to us as if one spoke of a sensation by directing one's attention to it. But where is the analogy? It evidently lies in the fact that one can point to a thing by looking or listening. But in certain circumstances, eve ghd pure n pointing to the object one is talking about may be quite inessential to the language-game, to one's thought. 670. Imagine that you were telephoning someone and you said to him: "This table is too tall", and pointed to the table. What is the role of pointing here? Can I say: I mean the table in question by pointing to it? What is this pointing for, and what are these words and whatever else may accompany them for? 671. And what do I point to by the inner activity of listening? To the sound that comes to my ears, and to the silence when I hear nothing Listening as it were looks for an auditory impression and hence can't point to it, but only to the place where it is looking for it. 672. If a receptive attitude is called a kind of 'pointing' to something— then that something is not the sensation which we get by means of it. 673. The mental attitude doesn't 'accompany what is said in the sense in which a gesture accompanies it. (As a man can travel alone, and yet be accompanied by my good wishes; or as a room can be empty, and yet full of light.) 674. Does one say, for example: "I didn't really mean my pain just now; my mind wasn't on it enough for that?" Do I ask myself, say: "What did I mean by this word just now? My attention was divided between my pain and the noise—"? I?0, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I 675. "Tell me, what was going on in you when you uttered the words . . . .?"—The answer to this is not: "I was meaning .... ."I 676. "I meant this by that word" is a statement which is differently used from one about an affection of the mind. 677. On the other hand: "When you were swearing just now, did you really mean it?" This is perhaps as much as to say: "Were you really angry?"—And the answer may be given as a result of introspection and is often some such thing as: "I didn't mean it very seriously", "I meant it half jokingly" and so on. There are differences of degree here. And one does indeed also say "I was half thinking of him when I said that." 678. pink hair straighteners What does this act of meaning (the pain, or the piano-tuning) consist in? No answer comes—for the answers which at first sight suggest themselves are of no use.—"And yet at the time I meant the one thing and not the other." Yes,—now you have only repeated with emphasis something which no one has contradicted anyway. 679. "But can you doubt that you meant //for?"—No; but neither can I be certain of it, know it. 680. When you tell me that you cursed and meant N. as you did so it is all one to me whether you looked at a picture of him, or imagined him, uttered his name, or what. The conclusions from this fact that interest me have nothing to do with these things. On the other hand, however, someone might explain to me that c ghd sale ursing was effective only when one had a clear image of the man or spoke coloured ghds uk his name out loud. But we should,not say "The point is how the man who is cursing means his victim." 681. Nor, of course, does one ask: "Are you sure that you cursed him, that the connexion with him was established?" Then this connexion must be very easy to establish, if one can be so sure of it? I Can know that it doesn't fail of its object I—Well, can it happen to me, to intend to write to one person and in fact write to another? and how might it happen? 682. "You said, 'It'll stop soon'.—Were you thinking of the noise or of your pain?" If he answers "I was thinking of the piano-tuning"— is he observing that the connexion existed, or is he making it by means PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I i7i. of these words?—Can't I say both? If what he said was true, didn't the connexion exist—and is he not for all that making one which did not exist? 683. I draw a head. You ask "Whom is that supposed to represent?"— I: "It's supposed to be N."—You: "But it doesn't look like him; if anything, it's rather like M."—When I said it represented N.— was I establishing a connexion or reporting one? And what connexion did exist? 684. What is there in favour of saying that my words describe an existing connexion? Well, they relate to various things which didn't simply make their appearance with the words. They say, for example, that I should have given a particular answer then, if I had been asked. And even if this is only conditional, still it does say something about the past. 685. "Look for A" does not mean "Look for B"; but I may do just the same thing in obeying the two orders. To say that something ghd mk4 different must happen in the two cases would be like saying that the propositions "Today is my birthday" and "My birthday is on April 26th" must refer to different days, because they do not make the same sense. 686. "Of course I meant B; I didn't think of A at all 1" "I wanted B to come to me, so as to . . ."—All this points to a wider context. 687. Instead of "I meant him" one can, of course, sometimes say "I thought of him"; sometimes even "Yes, we were speaking of him." Ask yourself what 'speaking of him' consists in. 688. In certain circumstances one can say "As I was speaking, I felt I was saying it tojou". But I should not say this if I were in any case talking with you. 689. "I am thinking of N." "I am speaking of N." How do I speak of him? I say, for instance, "I must go and see N today"——But surely that is not enough! After all, when I say "N" I might mean various people of this name.—"Then there must surely be a further, different connexion between my talk and N, for otherwise I should still not have meant HIM. Certainly such a connexion exists. Only not as you imagine it: namely by means of a mental mechanism. (One compares "meaning him" with "aiming at him".) i72. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I 690. What about the case where I at one time make an apparently innocent remark and accompany it with a furtive sidelong glance at someone; and at another time, without any such glance, speak of somebody present openly, mentioning his name—am I really thinking specially about him as I use his name? 691. When I make myself a sketch of N's face from memory, I can surely be said to mean him by my drawing. But which of the processes taking place while I draw (or before or afterwards) could I call meaning him? For one would naturally like to say: when he meant him, he aimed at him. But how is anyone doing that, when he calls someone else's face to mind? I mean, how does he call HIM to mind? coloured ghds H.on> does he call himt 692. Is it correct for someone to say: "When I gave you this rule, I meant you to .... . in this case"? Even if he did not think of this case at all as he gave the rule? Of course it is correct. For "to mean it" did not mean: to think of it. But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?—The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion. 693. "When I teach someone the formation of the series ... . I surely mean him to write ... . at the hundredth place."—Quite right; you mean it. And evidently without necessarily even thinking of it. This shews you how different the grammar of the verb "to mean" is from that of "to think". And nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity! Unless, that is, one is setting out to produce confusion. (It would also be possible to speak of an activity of butter when it rises in price, and if no problems are produced by this it is harmless.) PART II i One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not? A dog believes his master is at the door. But ca ghd flat iron n he also believe his master will come the day after to-morrow?—And what can he not do here?—How do I do it?—How am I sup ghd hair straightener south africa posed to answer this? Can only those hope who can talk? (3nly those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write.) "Grief" des
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